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Abstract
This paper illustrates how agents’ beliefs about economic outcomes
can dynamically synchronize and de-synchronize to produce business-
cycle-like fluctuations in a simple macroeconomic model. We consider
a simple macroeconomic model with multiple equilibria, which repre-
sent different ways in which sunspots can forecast future output in a
self-fulfilling manner. Agents are assumed to learn to use the sunspot
variable through econometric learning. We show that if different agents
have varied interpretations of the sunspot, this leads to a complex non-
linear dynamic of synchronization of beliefs concerning the equilibrium
played. Depending on the extent of disagreement on the interpreta-
tion of the sunspot, the economy will be more or less volatile. The
dispersion of agents’ beliefs is inversely related to volatility, since low
dispersion implies that output is very sensitive to extrinsic noise (the
sunspot). When disagreement crosses a critical threshold, the sunspot
is practically ignored and output is stable.
The model naturally generates stochastic volatility (although there is
no aggregate uncertainty), and explains features found in surveys of
professional forecasters.
1 Introduction
This paper has two goals: first, to analyze, in a model with strategic uncer-
tainty, how a sunspot can emerge as a coordination mechanism, even when
agents do not agree on what the sunspot is; and, second, to show that the
perpetual learning process leads to complex dynamics in terms of agents’
beliefs, whereby agents are more or less coordinated on the effect of the
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sunspot and, as a result, both average output and its volatility fluctuate
over time.
Sunspots are commonly used in macroeconomics to facilitate correlated
equilibria (Cass and Shell, 1983; Aumann et al., 1988). The literal interpre-
tation is that agents commonly observe some extrinsic source of randomness,
and incorporate it into their decision-making process in a manner that gen-
erates an actual law of motion equivalent to their perceived law of motion.
Clearly, there are plenty of processes in the world that are random – or at
least quasi-random for all practical purposes – and can therefore be used
as sunspots, but is such behaviour ever seen in the real world? Indeed,
if economists assert that a certain real-life system is well described by a
sunspot model, how is it that the sunspot cannot be identified?
Researchers have looked for evidence of the existence of sunspots in em-
pirical data (e.g. Benhabib and Spiegel, 2019; Nayar and Levchenko, 2017)
and in laboratory experiments (e.g. Fehr et al., 2019), but no one has sug-
gested a specific concrete variable that might be termed a sunspot.
Of course, one should not be so literal when interpreting a model: a
more plausible interpretation is that agents are continuously observing many
stochastic processes that may or may not be related to economic fundamen-
tals, and temporary coordination emerges somehow as an equilibrium result.
This interpretation, however, poses a new difficulty: if the particular source
of stochasticity is not clearly defined, how can agents learn to coordinate on
it? Sunspots in such equilibria are, by definition, only related to outcomes
because agents are coordinated in using them. Therefore, unlike signals
about fundamentals, it is far less clear if agents can understand its rela-
tionship to economic outcomes unless other agents are already coordinated.
Previous literature has assumed that agents know that some process, call
it {zt}, is potentially relevant to outcomes, and have analyzed the circum-
stances under which they can learn to use it,1 but this might be considerably
more difficult when they do not know what variables are potential sunspots
and perhaps have different preconceptions about the source of randomness.
To put this in more formal terms, in the above mentioned papers, and
in most sunspot applications, the sunspot process is assumed to be a well-
defined iid process. It could be something like the intensity of actual sunspots
(i.e. on the sun) at 8AM every day. However, another agent may think that
the sunspot is the same measurement performed at a fixed time after sunrise.
Both stochastic series would be iid with the same distribution as infinitely
1For example, see Woodford (1990); Guesnerie and Woodford (1990); Evans et al.
(1994); Evans and Honkapohja (2003a,b); Honkapohja and Mitra (2004).
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many other possibilities, and in the non-literal interpretation of sunspots,
where the identity of the sunspot is not clearly communicated, it is hard
to imagine that agents will not have such different interpretations. Thus,
the problem of learning to coordinate on sunspots is, primarily, the prob-
lem of learning to construct a stochastic process out of many sources of
randomness.
This paper demonstrates how, despite the above, it is perfectly possible
for agents to learn to coordinate, even if they do not agree at any given
moment on what the coordination mechanism is. To do this, we consider
a system with a continuum of sunspot equilibria that are distinguished by
different choices of the sunspot, and show that agents who are using a simple
learning rule can converge on identifying an outcome similar to an equilib-
rium, even while not agreeing on the identity of the sunspot. As the level of
disagreement increases up to some critical level, agents put less weight on
the sunspot and, beyond the critical level, the sunspot is ignored. This will
be defined precisely in the body of the paper.
Beyond proving that such imperfect coordination can emerge, the pa-
per seeks to argue that the dynamics that result have many features that
are actually desirable. The analysis demonstrates that the learning pro-
cess leads to complicated non-linear dynamics in the agents’ belief-space,
whereby beliefs go through periods of synchronization and of desynchroniza-
tion, and consequently the strategies neither converge on an equilibrium nor
diverge. Instead, there are long periods in which agents’ behaviour resembles
a sunspot equilibria, and then periods where the agents are not coordinated
on the use of the sunspot. Consequently, the economy goes through peri-
ods of high volatility (when the agents are coordinated on the sunspot) and
periods of low volatility (when the dis-coordination leads to agents’ actions
cancelling out and output being roughly constant). Thus, this paper is a
model of endogenously generated stochastic volatility.
In addition, agents’ beliefs display features that are observed empirically
in surveys of professional forecasters, and which are not easy to explain in
standard models. Specifically, we find that the individual uncertainty about
future output has a strong individual fixed-effect; and that output is nega-
tively correlated with both individual uncertainty and dispersion of beliefs
(although less strongly with the latter). These are exactly the features that
are observed in surveys of professional forecasters (Abel et al., 2016; Bloom,
2014; Dovern et al., 2011; Jurado et al., 2015; Rich and Tracy, 2018, 2010;
Mankiw et al., 2004; Ludvigson, 2016; Patton and Timmermann, 2010).
While the results of the paper can easily be adapted to any sunspot
model, for concreteness the focus here is on a modified version of a model
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from Benhabib, Wang, and Wen (2015). In the model, firms are trying to
learn about the relationship between k publicly observed stochastic processes
(zit , i = 1, . . . , k) and total output (yt). There are specific linear combina-
tions, yt = φ + ξ · zt, such that if all agents believed that output fluctuates
according to this formula, it would be self fulfilling, and these are the stable
equilibria of the model. However, I allow agents to have different notions
of the mapping between zit and z
i
t+1, and this difference, combined with the
learning process, leads to the complex dynamics in the belief space that are
described above.
The organization of this paper is as follows: after reviewing some of
the relevant literature in 2, the basic model is presented in section3. The
analysis of the model in section 4 is divided into three parts: subsection
4.1 derives the dynamic-stochastic equations of the model. Subsection 4.2
shows how exact analytical solutions can be obtained within a special limit,
and the properties of these solutions are analyzed in 4.3 using a general-
ization of impulse-response-functions. Though the exact solutions are only
valid within the special limit, numerical analysis discussed in 4.4 suggests
that important qualitative features of these solutions remain relevant in the
general case. Section 5 discusses the economic implications and the empir-
ical evidence supporting our model. Some additional comments are left to
section 6, and appendix A contains some of the mathematical derivations.
2 Related Literature
Learning has a long history in macroeconomics, but the stochastic recursive
description in this paper originates from Marcet and Sargent (1989). For a
comprehensive account of the state of this field see Evans and Honkapohja
(2012). Some papers concerning the presence of multiple equilibria and
sunspots are Woodford (1990); Guesnerie and Woodford (1990); Evans et al.
(1994); Evans and Honkapohja (2003a,b); Honkapohja and Mitra (2004).
Traditionally, the term sunspot is used in macroeconomics to describe a
situation where the dynamic equations of a system lead to indeterminacy,
and therefore a new stochastic process, the sunspot, can be introduced on
which agents coordinate their actions (for example Benhabib and Farmer,
1994; Christiano and Harrison, 1996). In these models the realization of
the stochastic process determines the equilibrium being played. In a more
recent paper Angeletos and La’O (2013) describe a different situation where
there is a unique equilibrium in which the agents use a random variable that
they call sentiment to choose their actions. While similar in spirit, these are
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formally different situations. This paper makes use of the model introduced
by Benhabib et al. (2015), which is similar to the latter in that the role of
the stochastic process is not to choose between equilibria.
As mentioned above, our model can be seen as a theory of endogenous
stochastic volatility. A recent review of this topic is by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde
and Guerro´n-Quintana (2020).
Subsection 5.1 gives empirical support to the model from the empir-
ical literature on forecasting, focusing on papers that analyze surveys of
professional forecasters (e.g. Abel et al., 2016; Bloom, 2014; Dovern et al.,
2011; Jurado et al., 2015; Rich and Tracy, 2010, 2018; Mankiw et al., 2004;
Ludvigson, 2016; Patton and Timmermann, 2010). Other mechanisms to
generate the same phenomena are discussed in Bloom (2014), Fajgelbaum
et al. (2017) and Zohar (2020).
The dynamics of the model are closely related to the Kuramoto model
(Kuramoto, 1975), which has been used to describe synchronization phenom-
ena across different disciplines and subject areas including synchronization
of flashing fireflies, phase lock in metronomes, and synchronized applause
at the end of a concert. The Kuramoto model describes a set of oscillators
whose phases are nonlinearly coupled, not unlike how the learning process
in our model links agents’ beliefs about the equilibrium being played. This
is, to our knowledge, the first time that this link has been made, and po-
tentially opens the door to incorporating into macroeconomics the rich phe-
nomena that the Kuramoto model can describe. Thorough introductions to
the model and reviews of the current state of the literature include Stro-
gatz (2000) and Acebro´n et al. (2005). The full model in this paper can
be seen as a Kuramoto model with three modifications: stochastic coupling,
nonlinear corrections, and amplitude interactions. Similar types of modifica-
tions have been studied in previous literature as extensions of the Kuramoto
model: multiplicative stochastic coupling has been studied in Park and Kim
(1996), generalized nonlinear interactions between phases in (Daido, 1993,
1994, 1996a,b), and amplitude interactions in (Ermentrout, 1990; Matthews
and Strogatz, 1990; Matthews et al., 1991).
3 Model Setup
The model setup is based on Benhabib, Wang, and Wen (2015).
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3.1 Households and Firms
3.1.1 Households
A representative household values streams of consumption Ct ≥ 0 and labor
Nt ≥ 0 according to
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt[logCt − ψNt], β ∈ (0, 1), ψ > 0,
and is subject to the budget constraint
PtCt ≤WtNt +Πt,
where Pt,Wt and Πt are the prices of the consumption good, the nominal
wage, and the profits from ownership of firms, respectively.
The household’s first-order conditions are
Ct =
1
ψ
·
Wt
Pt
, Nt =
1
ψ
−
Πt
Wt
. (1)
3.1.2 Final Good Producers
The consumption good is produced by competitive final good producers
using a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], with the
stochastic technology
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
ǫθjtY
1−θ
jt dj
] 1
1−θ
, θ > 0 (2)
where ǫjt are iid random variables, and can be interpreted as preference
shocks. We shall assume throughout that log ǫjt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε ).
Denoting the price of good j at time t by Pjt, the demand for interme-
diate good j is given by
(
Yjt
Yt
)θ
=
Pt
Pjt
εθjt.
From this we also get the relationship:
P
1−1/θ
t =
∫ 1
0
ǫjtP
1−1/θ
jt dj.
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3.1.3 Intermediate Goods Producers
Each variety of intermediate good j is manufactured by a monopolist using
labor as the only input and with the production function: Yjt = ANjt. The
intermediate good manufacturers must decide on their level of production
simultaneously at the beginning of the period without observing the shocks
ǫjt. After these decisions have been made, prices are set so that markets
clear, similarly to a Cornout competition.
The intermediate good producers’ problem is therefore
max
Yjt
Ejt[(Pjt −Wt/A)Yjt],
where Ejt represents the firm’s expectation operator conditioned on the
information (and beliefs) available to firm j at time t, which will be described
below. The first-order-condition is
Yjt = Ejt
[
A(1 − θ)
Pt
Wt
Y θt ǫ
θ
jt
]1/θ
.
Substituting (1) into the above, we get
Yjt = Ejt
[
A(1− θ)
ψ
Y θ−1t ǫ
θ
jt
]1/θ
= Ejt
[
Y θ−1t ǫ
θ
jt
]1/θ
,
where in the last step, without loss of generality, units of output are chosen
such that ψ = A(1 − θ). Finally, it is useful to redefine yt = log Yt, and
εjt = log ǫjt so that we have
yjt =
1
θ
logEjt
[
eθǫjt−(1−θ)yt
]
. (3)
3.2 Information
A large number of ’forecasters’ observe both firm specific shocks ǫjt and
a “sunspot” variable zt. The process {zt}
∞
t=0 is a standard Gaussian white
noise vector: that is, for all t, zt ∈ R
k is multivariate normal N(0, Ik) (k > 1),
and independent across t.
The intermediate-good firms do not get to see zt directly. Instead, they
rely on a survey of forecasters to estimate their demand curves. However,
the firm is limited in its ability to conduct market research, so it eventually
obtains a signal that mixes the information that the forecasters have:
sjt = λεjt + (1− λ)E
f
t yt, λ ∈ (0, 1/2), (4)
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where Eft yt is the forecasters’ estimate average for yt. The value of zt is
revealed at the end of each period after all decisions have been made.
Benhabib et al. (2015) show that it is always an equilibrium for the
agents to ignore zt and believe that
yt = θσ
2
ε/(2(1 − θ)) ≡ φ
C . (5)
In this case sjt reveals εjt to the firms, so the firms each produce the efficient
amount and overall output is constant. However, when λ < 1/2, they also
find a sunspot equilibrium. In our notation, the sunspot equilibrium is
obtained when all agents assume that output follows yt = φ
S + ξS · zt with
‖ξS‖2 =
θλ(1− 2λ)
(1− λ)2
σ2ε , φ
S = φC
(
1−
(1− θ)(1− 2λ)
1− λ
)
. (6)
These are sunspot equilibria: when the projection of zt on a certain vector
ξS is high the firms get a high signal, but since they do not know whether
the signal is high due to εjt or yt being high, they overproduce, and yt ends
up high as a result. Any vector ξS that satisfies the norm condition above
can serve as an equilibrium.
3.3 Learning
The sunspot process (zt ∈ R
k) in our model represents nondescript amor-
phous variables that may affect agents expectations about economic out-
comes. These are so called ‘sentiments’ variables. The stochastic equilibrium
above only imposes a condition on the variance of output. Therefore, any
stochastic process z˜t = Mtzt can serve as the sunspot as long as {Mt}
∞
t=0
are orthogonal matrices. Different agents having different understandings
of what the sunspot is means that we should allow for different choices of
{Mt}
∞
t=0 for each agent.
For concreteness, it is assumed that each agent is considering a sunspot
series of the form z˜jt = (M
j)tzt, that is, agent j’s ‘sentiment’ at time t +
1 is affected by a realization of zt+1 in the same way that it would be
affected by the realization zt =M
jzt+1 at time t. Limiting our attention to
time-independentM j is assuming a constant drift that creates differences in
how agents perceive the sunspot.2 This assumption is somewhat arbitrary
and, although it leads to tractable results, other options are certainly worth
2Notice that we are not discussing how the sentiment affects the agents’ expectations,
only how they perceive the latent sunspot process.
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studying. Choosing M j to be identical for all agents is simply the model of
Benhabib et al. (2015).
At any point in time, all agents are assumed to have the point-belief
that output is related to the sunspot via yt = log Yt = φ
j + ξ˜j · z˜jt , with
(φj , ξ˜j) ∈ Rk+1. In other words, we limit the belief space of each agent
to points in Rk+1. At the end of the period, the variable zt and yt are
revealed, and firms update their beliefs. This non-Bayesian form of learning
is sometimes called econometric learning, and has been used extensively in
macroeconomics.3
The updating process can be written recursively:(
φjt+1
ξ˜jt+1
)
=
(
φjt
ξ˜jt
)
+ gtΥ
j
t+1
−1
(
1
z˜jt
)
(yt − φ
j
t − ξ˜
j
t · z˜
j
t ),
Υjt+1 = Υ
j
t + gt
[(
1
z˜jt
)
·
(
1
z˜jt
)′
−Υjt
]
=
= (1− gt)Υ
j
t + gt
(
1 0
0 M j
)(
1 z′t
zt ztz
′
t
)(
1 0
0 M j
′
)
where gt is the gain sequence and Υ
j
t is the estimated variance-covariance
matrix. The gain sequence gt = 1/t corresponds to least-square learning
(RLS), and replicates the OLS estimator. This paper employs the RLS gain
sequence as well as the sequence gt = (1 − q)/(1 − q
t), that corresponds to
weighting past observations with a factor of q ∈ (0, 1) per-time-period. It
is more reasonable to assume that agents who live in an environment that
seems to keep changing would prefer to employ the latter gain sequence, in
order to react faster to changes.
The estimator Υjt depends on the initial prior Υ
j
0, on M
j, and on the re-
alizations of zt. Using the strong law of large numbers, it is straightforward
to show that if gt = 1/t or gt → 1 − q, the estimators limt→∞Υ
j
t = Ik+1
uniformly over j. This is simply stating that all agents, regardless of their
M j , must come to agree on the variance-covariance matrix of the sunspot
regardless of how they interpret it. Thus, for simplicity, it is assumed that
Υjt = Ik+1 throughout. Furthermore, by redefining ξ˜
j
t = (M
j)tξjt , the learn-
ing process simplifies to
φjt+1 = φ
j
t + gt(yt − φ
j
t − ξ
j
t · zt), (7a)
ξjt+1 =M
j ′ · (ξjt + gtzt(yt − φ
j
t − ξ
j
t · zt)). (7b)
3For a comprehensive account of this approach, see Evans and Honkapohja (2012)
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Finally, the beliefs of the forecasters at the beginning of every period are
assumed to be identically distributed to those of the firms. This simplifying
assumption is similar to assuming that firms do get to observe zt but with
a very large error, so that this information is not useful for making their
own prediction about output, and that the surveys are conducted by polling
representatives of other firms.
4 Analysis
4.1 Solving the Firm’s Problem
In the appendix I show that a firm whose beliefs are given by (φj , ξj), and
receives the signal sjt will choose to produce:
yjt = (1− θ
−1)φj + θ−1
[
m(‖ξj‖2)sjt +
1
2
Σˆ(‖ξj‖2)
]
,
where
m(‖ξj‖2) =
θλσ2ε − (1− λ)(1− θ)‖ξ
j‖2
λ2σ2ε + (1− λ)
2‖ξj‖2
, (8a)
Σˆ(‖ξj‖2) =
(θ + λ− 2θλ)2‖ξj‖2σ2ε
λ2σ2ε + (1− λ)
2‖ξj‖2
. (8b)
By integrating over all firms we get (the full derivation is in appendix A.1)
yt =
1
1− θ
log
∫ 1
0
e(1−θ)(A
j+Bj ·zt)dj, (9)
where
Aj =
σ2ε
2(1 − θ)
[
θ +
1− θ
θ
λm(‖ξj‖2)
]2
+
1
2θ
Σˆ(‖ξj‖2)−
(1− θ)
θ
φj,
Bj =
(1− λ)
θ
m(‖ξj‖2)〈ξi〉.
4.2 Exact Stationary Solutions of the Associated ODE
Equation (9) describes the mapping from the full belief space to actual out-
put. Equations (7) describe how beliefs are updated after each period. To-
gether (7) and (9) form a stochastic difference equation that fully describes
the dynamics of the model.
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In standard learning models, one can obtain an associated ordinary dif-
ferential equation by fixing the beliefs, and taking expectations of (7) (see
Evans and Honkapohja, 2012, chap. 6). The intuitive explanation for this
is that when the gain gt is small, agents are observing many realizations
of (yt, zt) while their beliefs are not changing significantly. In the limit of
g → 0, the stochastic difference equation can be approximated by taking
a continuous-time limit and replacing the stochastic right-hand-side of (7)
with its expectation with respect to zt.
However, in our model the drift in the perception of beliefs also scales
with time, so taking the continuous-time limit requires also replacing the
matrix M j with its continuous time counterpart. For concreteness, consider
the three-dimensional model (k = 2), and let the M j matrices be M j =
M(αj), where
M(α) =
(
cosα sinα
− sinα cosα
)
,
and αj is distributed symmetrically around zero: that is, we include all the
special-orthogonal matrices and choose some distribution around the unit
matrix. In the continuous-time limit we take g → 0 and αj → 0, while g/αj
remains constant. In this limit, to first order
M j =M(αj) = I2 +
(
0 1
−1 0
)
α+O(α2).
Substituting the above into (7), taking expectations with respect to zt,
and taking the continuous-time limit, we have
φ˙jt = gt(Ezyt − φ
j
t), (10)
ξ˙jt =
αj
gt
(
0 −1
1 0
)
· ξjt + gtEz[zt(yt − ξ
j
t · zt)]. (11)
The next natural step is to ask if the ODE system has stationary solu-
tions. From (10), φ˙jt = 0 implies φ
j = Ezyt, which means that all agents
have a common belief φj = φ. Next, assume that
〈
ξj
〉
is in the 1-direction4
Thus, in (9), the Bj ·zt term is independent of z
2, and therefore Ez[yz
2] = 0.
Equation (11) becomes
0 =
αj
g
(
−ξj
2
ξj
1
)
+
(
Ez[yz
1]− ξj
1
−ξj
2
)
.
4This is without loss of generality since we can always rotate the axes to achieve this.
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The second component implies that ξj = Rj(cosψj , sinψj), where tanψj =
αj/g (which is held constant at the continuous-time limit). Substituting
this into the first component gives: Rj = Ez[yz
1] cosψj . In particular, we
find that Rj is proportional to cosψj , with the constant of proportionality
common to all agents: thus
ξj = R cosψj
(
cosψj
sinψj
)
, tanψj =
αj
g
, ψ ∈
(
−
π
2
,
π
2
)
. (12)
All that remains is to find R. To do this, we substitute the above into
(9), and calculate Ez[yz
1]. The resulting equation is
R =
1
1− θ
E
[
z1 log
∫ 1
0
e(1−θ)(A˜
j+B˜jz1)dj
]
. (13)
where
A˜j =
σ2ε
2(1 − θ)
[
θ +
1− θ
θ
λm(R2 cos2 ψj)
]2
+
1
2θ
Σˆ(R2 cos2 ψj),
B˜j =
(1− λ)
θ
m(R2 cos2 ψj)R〈cos2 ψi〉.
The derivation is in the appendix (A.2), which also contains a worked out
example for a simple case where (13) can be evaluated analytically. Typ-
ically, one must evaluate the right-hand side of (13) numerically, but this
is still straightforward since the distributions of ψj and z1 are known, and
therefore the right-hand-side of (13) is purely a function of R.
4.3 Analysis of the Stationary Solutions and IRFs
Equation (13) always admits the solution R = 0: in this case B˜j = 0,
implying that the right-hand side of (13) also vanishes. In this solution
ξj = 0 and φj = φC for all j, and output is constant. Economically, this
solution reflects a situation in which agents do not learn to coordinate on
the sunspot, and end up playing the non-stochastic equilibrium of equation
(5). This equilibrium is not stable for λ < 1/2 in the original model of
Benhabib et al. (2015), but can be stable in our model when the variance of
αj is large enough.
Equation (13) may have additional solutions with R > 0. In these solu-
tions, agents are imperfectly coordinated on the use of the sunspots. The
beliefs ξj , as described by (12) are all located on a circle of radius R/2, and
centered a distance of R/2 from the origin. This is depicted in figure 1 for
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three uniform distributions αj/g ∼U[−η, η]. The solutions with R > 0 are
analogous to the stochastic solutions of Benhabib et al. (2015), but unlike in
their model, where all agents share the same ξj with ‖ξj‖ = ξS (see equation
(6)), we have heterogeneous beliefs.
As explained in the previous subsection, the stationary solutions exist
in the limit where learning is ‘slow’, in the sense that agents get to observe
many realizations of zt with beliefs held close to constant. This leads us
to suggest a natural extension to the concept of impulse-response-functions
(IRF): we start at an exact stationary solution, fix g > 0 and study how
beliefs change in response to a particular realization of zt. In figure 2 we
draw two IRFs describing the reaction to realizations of zt that are parallel
and perpendicular to
〈
ξj
〉
.
The initial belief distribution is represented by the dotted black line. As
in (12), we choose a solution in which
〈
ξj
〉
is in the 1-direction, thus, a
parallel (perpendicular) sunspot shock is proportional to zt = (1, 0) (zt =
(0, 1)). The perpendicular shock has no effect on output, because the action
of each agent with αj > 0 is cancelled by an agent with −αj . A parallel shock
will increase or decrease output depending on the sign of z1t . Therefore, a
perpendicular shock causes agents to decrease the perpendicular component
of their ξj , which squishes the distribution towards the 1-axis (see the dashed
red line). Conversely, a parallel shock leads agents to increase the parallel
component of their belief and causes the distribution to expand outward
(the solid blue line).
The impulse responses demonstrate an important phenomenon: there
is a positive correlation between uncertainty and disagreement. In peri-
ods where agents have more similar beliefs – such as following a perpen-
dicular shock – the uncertainty that the average agent has about output
(
〈
|ξj|
〉
) is smaller. Similarly, following parallel shocks both disagreement
and uncertainty are higher. So far we have demonstrated this with the
impulse-response functions, but in the following it is argued that it holds
more generally in the model.
4.4 Numerical Analysis
The general model defined by (7) and (9) is a stochastic nonlinear model, and
as such not many analytical results can be obtained. However, numerical
simulations suggest that the solutions described in the previous subsection
capture many of its important characteristics.
To get a general impression, first let us choose the particular distribu-
tion αj ∼ N(0, η2). Figure 3 displays the results of three typical trial runs
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with low, mid, and high values of η.5 In the left column of the figure, we
see that when η is small, the solution is a noisy version of the stochastic
equilibria of (6): the average belief about φ is close to φS and the beliefs
about ξ remain close to some point on a circle of radius ξS . We call this
case ’synchronization’.
Turning to the right-most column, we see that when η is high, coordina-
tion fails and players end up playing the non-stochastic equilibrium. This
equilibrium would not be stable with rational agents (for λ < 1/2), but
the disagreement over choice of a sunspot precludes coordination with our
non-rational agents.
Finally, the central column illustrates the case for an intermediate value
of η. Here we see an example of a learning process that does not converge,
and yet does not diverge either. Over time beliefs about the use of the
sunspot ξjt converge and increase the average ‖〈ξ
j
t 〉‖, but then rapidly diverge
as coordination fails. Consequently, output becomes more or less volatile,
and average output fluctuates between φS and φC .
Conjecture 1. Consider the main model with αj ∼ N(0, η2), and gt =
(1 − q)/(1 − qt). If equation (13) has no solution with R > 0, then for all
sufficiently small |1 − q| as t → 0 the beliefs weakly converge to the non-
stochastic equilibria, i.e. φjt → φ
C and ξj → 0.
We test this conjecture by fixing all the model parameters except η. We
first find the bifurcation point of (13) and denote it by η∗. It is defined
by the condition that there exist non-zero solutions if and only if η < η∗.
Next, we run numerical simulations of the full model for η > η∗ and test for
convergence to the non-stochastic equilibria. This was performed for many
values of θ ∈ (0, 1), λ ∈ (0, 1/2) and q ∈ (0, 0.1) and we have not found a
counter-example.
We can now describe the full behaviour of the model. Starting at η = 0,
the model converges to one of the stochastic equilibria where φjt → φ
S and
ξjt all converge on a point on a circle of radius ξ
S . As η is increased from
zero to η∗, two things happen: first, the radius of the associated stationary
solution decreases from ξS to zero, and, second, the learning process becomes
more ’noisy’. Thus, for small η the model can roughly be described as small
5The technical details of the simulations: we fix all parameter values, discretize to
J = 800 agents, and set αj = ηΦ−1(j/J), gt = (1 − q)/(1 − q
t). Initial conditions
are chosen at random. The simulation is run for T = 105 periods with different initial
conditions. The results reported in the graph are typical for many values of the parameters
that have been checked (the only requirements are λ < 1/2 and 1 − q small enough to
avoid immediate divergence).
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fluctuations around the stationary solution with R slightly smaller than
ξS , and for large η (but below η∗) the motion in the belief space appears
to be very chaotic. Finally, once η is increased beyond η∗, we are in the
regime of the above conjecture and the model converges to the non-stochastic
equilibrium.6 To better understand the above interpolation, figure 4 displays
summary results of simulations for different values of η.7 The four subplots
display the values of: (a) the average φjt across agents, (b) the dispersion
of φj across agents:
〈
(φjt )
2
〉
−
〈
φjt
〉2
, (c) the norm of the average ξjt , (d)
the dispersion of the last quantity across agents. Note that these quantities
change over time, so every point in the plot is an average both across time
and across simulations. The dashed lines are standard deviations which
give a sense of the ergodic distribution. These results suggest that the
distributions are continuous in η. They also show the bifurcation point:
above some η∗ the system is exactly at the deterministic equilibrium, and
the statistics (b)-(d) appear to have a discontinuous first derivative at the
critical point.
5 Economic Implications and Empirical Evidence
The first conclusion of this paper is that synchronization on sunspot models
does not require agents to be able to agree explicitly on what the sunspot
is. As long as the different interpretations are not too far apart, agents can
spontaneously learn to synchronize on the use of random noise, and while
they will differ in their use of the noise, in the aggregate there will be a
sunspot that is correlated with output.
The second conclusion is that, unless the differences in interpretation
are minimal, the learning dynamics will not lead to a settled use of the
sunspot. Rather, the process leads to a constant flow in the belief-space
that generates periods of higher and lower levels of coordination. In periods
of high coordination, the sunspot has a larger impact on agents’ actions,
which results in output being more volatile. We can, in fact, translate the
results for low, high, and mid dispersions in αj into three corresponding
macroeconomic scenarios: (a) output is constantly volatile, (b) output is
6The motion of ξjt through the belief space for different values of η is best illustrated
in a video that we have made available at https://youtu.be/Xn2DR-CmWTg.
7Here we run the simulation a number of times with different initial conditions. We
drop the first 1000 periods and calculate the statistics for the remaining periods. The
averages are over time and runs, and the dashed lines represent a one-standard-error
interval around the means, i.e. it is a statistic of the ergodic distribution of the variable.
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constantly non-volatile ,(c) the volatility of output is itself volatile. This
will also correspond to low (a,b) or high (c) levels of dispersion of beliefs of
forecasters.
Thus, this model is a theory of how coordination emerges, and also
of endogenously generated stochastic volatility. Furthermore, the model
explains why we should expect agents’ agreement on the use of any specific
sunspot to be stable over a long period of time.
In the following subsection we describe some more implications of the
model which are supported by empirical findings from surveys of professional
forecasters.
5.1 Comparison to Surveys of Forecasters
Since this paper is all about beliefs, it makes sense to compare our findings
to those from the literature analyzing surveys of professional forecasters. To
do so, we first need to define how we relate the quantities in our model to
empirical variables. The following table describes the most natural relation-
ship:
Model Concept Variable Survey Concept
Individual point belief about
future output (before observ-
ing the sunspot)
φjt Individual forecast for next
period
Average belief about future
output
〈φjt 〉 Average forecast for next pe-
riod
Disagreement about future
output
V (φjt ),
8 Average forecast for next pe-
riod
Individual uncertainty about
future output
‖ξjt ‖ Individual forecast uncer-
tainty for next period
Average uncertainty about fu-
ture output
〈‖ξjt ‖〉 Average uncertainty for next
period
It is generally accepted that individual uncertainty about the future is
counter-cyclical (Bloom, 2014; Bloom et al., 2018; Fajgelbaum et al., 2017;
Ludvigson, 2016). This also holds in our model, and is a direct result of the
fact that φC > φS . Generally speaking, agents are more uncertain about the
future when they believe that the sunspot is more important (‖ξj‖ is larger),
and Ez[yt] can be shown to be lower when this happens. This perception
was verified in simulations.
8The variance is over j at a given t.
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While previous literature offers models that demonstrate how an exoge-
nous increase in uncertainty can generate a recession, or, conversely, how an
exogenous negative shock to output causes an increase to uncertainty, in this
paper both are a result of a third mechanism: the build-up of coordination.
Belief dispersion is also counter-cyclical and positively correlated with
uncertainty, but the relationship appears to be weaker (Jurado et al., 2015;
Rich and Tracy, 2018, 2010; Mankiw et al., 2004). There are two ways to
measure disagreement in our model, depending on whether we consider the
forecast that agents make before or after observing the sunspot. In either
case, our model predicts the empirical finding, but the reasoning is slightly
different: if we consider the forecast after observing the sunspot, then it is
enough to note that since the ξj fluctuate around the stationary solution,
which is a circle of radius R, they are larger when they are also further away
from each other. Therefore, larger average uncertainty (〈‖ξj‖〉)) is associated
with more dispersion in the forecast (dispersion of φj + ξjzt). If we consider
the forecast before observing the sunspot, then it is an indirect result of the
fact that more dispersion in ξj is associated with more dispersion in φj as a
result of the learning process. Since agents are observing the same (zt, yt),
estimating different ξj can only be consistent with also estimating different
φj .
In numerical simulations we find the correlation between belief dispersion
and output to be negative, but smaller than the correlation between uncer-
tainty and output. We also find the correlation between belief dispersion
and uncertainty to be positive.9
Another important finding of Rich and Tracy (2018) is that much of the
variation in forecasters’ uncertainty is explained by a fixed effect: that is,
some forecasters just tend to be more uncertain about the economy. This
also holds in our model: those agents with larger αj will consistently have
lower ‖ξj‖. Intuitively, these agents’ understanding of what the sunspot is
is persistently farther away from the average understanding, and therefore,
the learning process leads them to downplay the importance of the sunspot
relative to agents with lower αj .
9To the best of our knowledge the only paper other than this that endogenously gen-
erates a positive correlation between belief dispersion and uncertainty is Zohar (2020).
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6 Additional Comments
6.1 Will they ever learn?
The agents in our model are using a misspecified learning model: they are
not considering a law of motion with time-independent parameters, which is
not the actual law of motion when other agents are also learning. Clearly, an
agent who understands this could profit by making superior forecasts. How-
ever, this would require a very clever agent, who is also able to understand
how other agents perceive the sunspot. Since the premise of the model was
that the sunspot is not easily definable, that seems unlikely.
Still, one can try to address this concern by considering a modification
of the model in which the forecasters who consistently make bad predictions
fall out of the profession over time. Recall that the deterministic solution
(12) describes a circle, and note that the forecast error is on average simply
the difference between the belief of the agent and the average belief. If the
average belief was the center of the circle, then there would be no difference
in the average forecast error. Thus, in the deterministic model one can figure
out which agents will get eliminated by considering the difference between
the average belief and the center of the circle. One can construct examples
where the worst forecasters are the ones with extreme values of αj , and
examples where they are the ones close to the mean. Therefore, dropping
the worst forecasters might increase or decrease dispersion.
More specifically, when dispersion is low, the agents with the αj that is
farthest from the mean are the ones making the worst predictions. If they
fall out, then dispersion becomes even lower until eventually we reach the
S equilibrium of the rational expectations model. When dispersion is high,
all the agents are virtually ignoring the sunspot, so no elimination would
happen at all. For medium levels of dispersion, the relationship is not so
clear: even if it is true that on average and over long periods of time the
agents with extreme αj are the worst forecasters, over short periods of time
the differences are small compared to the variance, and the stochastic nature
of the sunspot combined with the seemingly chaotic flows in the belief space
introduce uncertainty into who will drop out. In numerical simulations we
find that even over samples of 30-40 periods, sometimes it is actually the
agents close to the mean who are performing worst.
To conclude, close to the extreme levels of dispersion, termination of
‘bad’ forecasters will reinforce the results we already have. For medium
levels, the details of the model in combination with the rate of attrition will
determine in which direction things go.
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6.2 The Kuramoto Connection and the Matthews-Strogatz
Model
Finally, we would like to add a comment about a similarity between our
model and a version of the Kuramoto model (Kuramoto, 1975) that is due
to Matthews and Strogatz (1990) (hence, MS).
In section 4.2 I derived equation (10). Using equation (9) to substitute
out yt in the right-hand side of (10) and expanding to second order in ξ
j
t ,
one can derive:
ξ˙jt =
αj
gt
(
0 −1
1 0
)
·ξjt+g
(〈
ξit
〉
− ξjt
)
−
g
θ
〈
1 +
λ(θ(1− 2λ) + λ)σ2ǫ
(1− λ)2(‖ξit‖
2 − ξS
2
)
〉−1 〈
ξit
〉
.
(14)
This equation bears similarity to an equation studied by MS, which can be
written as:10
ξ˙jt =
(
0 −ωj
ωj 0
)
· ξjt + g
(〈
ξit
〉
− ξjt
)
− (‖ξjt ‖
2 − ξS
2
)ξjt . (15)
The first two terms are identical. To first order, the last term of (14) is
proportional to (
〈
‖ξit‖
2
〉
− ξS
2
)
〈
ξi
〉
, which is the same as (15) except that
the latter has ξjt instead of
〈
ξit
〉
.
Both equations (14) and (15) lead to steady-state solutions where agents
are synchronized and a trivial ξjt = 0 solution. In addition, both systems
have regions of the parameter space where each of the steady-state solutions
is a global attractor. MS find additional regions where neither of the above
are attractors, which is not the case in our model. The reason for the
difference is due to the last term of the equation. In equation (15) each ξj
has its own natural frequency ωj, an interaction with the average
〈
ξi
〉
, and
a nonlinear interaction with itself. Without the interaction between ξj and
the average, all agents would end up moving in a circle of radius ξS, with
constant angular velocity ωj. In (14) there is no limit cycle. Lacking the
interaction with the average, each agent would spiral down to ξj = 0.
The phenomena that MS find (e.g. periodic fluctuations, non-periodic
fluctuations, chaos) are fascinating and should be of interest to economists.
Models that combine the methods of this paper with limit-cycle models
would naturally lead to these phenomena.
10The notation was changed to conform to the notation of this paper
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A Mathematical Derivations
A.1 The Firm’s Problem
First, consider a firm whose beliefs are given by (φj , ξj). Defining xjt =
(θ − 1)(yt − φ
j) + θεjt, we have from (3)
yjt = θ
−1 logEjt
[
e(θ−1)yt+θǫjt|sjt
]
= (1−θ−1)φj+θ−1 logEjt [e
xjt |sjt] . (16)
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Since log ǫj,t ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε ), we have Ejt[xjt] = Ejt[sjt] = 0, and the subjective
variance-covariance matrix of (xjt, sjt) is
Σ =
(
θ2σ2ε + (1− θ)
2‖ξj‖2 θλσ2ε − (1− λ)(1 − θ)‖ξ
j‖2
sym. λ2σ2ε + (1− λ)
2‖ξj‖2
)
.
Therefore, xjt|sjt ∼ N(m(‖ξ
j‖2)sjt, Σˆ(‖ξ
j‖2)), where
m(‖ξj‖2) =
θλσ2ε − (1− λ)(1− θ)‖ξ
j‖2
λ2σ2ε + (1− λ)
2‖ξj‖2
,
Σˆ(‖ξj‖2) =
(θ + λ− 2θλ)2‖ξj‖2σ2ε
λ2σ2ε + (1− λ)
2‖ξj‖2
.
Therefore, from (16)
yjt = (1− θ
−1)φj + θ−1
[
m(‖ξj‖2)sjt +
1
2
Σˆ(‖ξj‖2)
]
.
Using this in (2),
(1− θ)yt = log
∫ 1
0
eθεjt+(1−θ)yjtdj =
= log
∫ 1
0
eθεjt+(1−θ){(1−θ
−1)φj+θ−1[m(‖ξj‖2)sjt+
1
2
Σˆ(‖ξj‖2)]}dj =
= log
∫ 1
0
eθεjt+(1−θ){(1−θ
−1)φj+θ−1[m(‖ξj‖2)(λεjt+(1−λ)〈ξi〉·zt)+ 12 Σˆ(‖ξ
j‖2)]}dj,
where (4) is used in the last step. Since εjt is independent of beliefs, we can
integrate
yt =
1
1− θ
log
∫ 1
0
e(1−θ)(A
j+Bj ·zt)dj,
where
Aj =
σ2ε
2(1 − θ)
[
θ +
1− θ
θ
λm(‖ξj‖2)
]2
+
1
2θ
Σˆ(‖ξj‖2)−
(1− θ)
θ
φj,
Bj =
(1− λ)
θ
m(‖ξj‖2)〈ξi〉.
24
A.2 Solving for R
Starting with (9), we substitute φj = φ and
ξj = R cosψj
(
cosψj
sinψj
)
, tanψj =
αj
g
,
to find
y =
1
1− θ
log
∫ 1
0
e(1−θ)(A˜
j+B˜jz1)dj −
1− θ
θ
φ,
where
A˜j =
σ2ε
2(1 − θ)
[
θ +
1− θ
θ
λm(R2 cos2 ψj)
]2
+
1
2θ
Σˆ(R2 cos2 ψj),
B˜j =
(1− λ)
θ
m(R2 cos2 ψj)R〈cos2 ψi〉.
Since R = E[yz1], we find
R =
1
1− θ
E
[
z1 log
∫ 1
0
e(1−θ)(A˜
j+B˜jz1)dj
]
. (17)
Recall that the ψj ’s are all known, so while the right-hand side of (17) is
complicated, it is always straightforward to evaluate numerically, and the
result is only a function of R (and the model parameters θ, λ and σǫ).
For example, consider the simple case where
αj =
{
+α¯ j ∈ [0, 1/2]
−α¯ j ∈ (1/2, 1]
Note that in this example, ψj is equal to ψ¯ for one half of the population
and −ψ¯ for the other, therefore A˜j and B˜j are independent of j, therefore
(17) simplifies to
R = B˜j =
(1− λ)
θ
m(R2 cos2 ψ¯)R cos2 ψ¯.
This equation has the trivial solution R = 0 and another nontrivial solution
R > 0 if(
λ
1− λ
− cos2 ψ¯
)(
θ
1− θ
− cos2 ψ¯
)
> 0.
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Figure 1: The steady state solution of the steady-state solution to the (fully
nonlinear) non-stochastic model for different values of η. The outer circle is
of radius ξS .
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Figure 2: The ‘Impulse Response Functions’ described in subsection 4.3.
The dotted black line is the steady-state solution to the (fully nonlinear) non-
stochastic model. The solid and dashed lines show how the ξj distributions
react to a shocks parallel and perpendicular to
〈
ξi
〉
respectively. The average
belief at t = 0 and after the parallel and perpendicular shocks are denoted
by a plus, square and diamond respectively.
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Figure 3: The left, center, and right columns, are each an example of a
simulation of the full system for low, mid and high values of η respectively. In
each column the top graph displays the evolution of the average belief
〈
φjt
〉
.
The middle graph shows the norm of the average belief on ξ, i.e. ‖
〈
ξjt
〉
‖.
The remaining parameters are: θ = 2/3, λ = 1/4, σǫ = 1, q = 0.9. A video
of these simulations is available at https://youtu.be/Xn2DR-CmWTg
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Figure 4: Summary statistics for simulations of the main model. The hori-
zontal axes display values of η, and all other parameters are kept constant
as in the previous figure.
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